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Summary
The Home Office’s flawed reaction to a systemic failure by a private company has had 
a detrimental impact on the lives of over 50,000 overseas students the Home Office 
accused of cheating. Despite being aware of longstanding abuses in the Tier 4 student 
visa system, the Department designed an English language testing system that failed to 
recognise the potential incentive for sponsors and students to cheat. The Department 
appears to have been caught by surprise by the extent of fraud occurring in test centres. 
The system it designed left it with limited means to seek compensation from ETS Global 
BV, securing just £1.6 million in compensation for taxpayers, despite spending an 
estimated £21 million to respond to the cheating.
The Home Office’s pace of response to the issue of cheating has either been ‘full throttle’ 
or ‘too slow’, with no middle ground. It has been quick to act on imperfect evidence, 
but slow in responding to indications that innocent people may have been caught up in 
its actions. The Home Office’s decision to revoke the visas of thousands of individuals 
before properly verifying evidence provided by ETS has led to injustice and hardship 
for many people. The Department recognises that hundreds of students maintain their 
innocence but continues to suggest that there is only a small risk that people have been 
wrongly caught up in their actions. We are staggered that the Department thinks it is 
acceptable to have so little regard for the impact its actions might have on innocent 
people.
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Introduction
The Home Office (the Department) designs and administers the points-based visa system 
which allows students from outside the European Economic Area to study in the UK. 
Most of these students must support their visa application by achieving a pre-determined 
level on a licensed and approved Secure English Language Test (SELT). The Test of 
English for International Communication (TOEIC), administered by the American 
provider ETS, was an approved SELT between 2011 and 2014. In 2014, however, a BBC 
Panorama investigation exposed wide-scale organised cheating on TOEIC tests, leading 
the Department to establish a Gold Command team in February 2014. The Department 
then took action against over 50,000 individuals. At least 11,356 of these people have since 
voluntarily left the UK, while the Department has removed or refused re-entry to the 
UK to at least 2,859 individuals. Hundreds, possibly thousands, continue to protest their 
innocence. Since April 2014, at least 12,500 appeals involving individuals matched to 
invalid or questionable TOEIC certificates have been heard by the courts. 40% of people 
making appeals to the first-tier tribunal have won their appeal. However, the Department 
continues to rely upon the evidence provided by ETS. To date, the Home Office has not 
taken any further steps to support individuals who are affected by its actions.
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Conclusions and recommendations
1. The Home Office’s design of the Tier 4 visa system left it open to large-scale abuse. 
Before 2014, the Department had been aware of issues of abuse within the Tier 4 
system for some time and had already started to act on some of these abuses. In 
2012 we examined the implementation of the Tier 4 visa system and recommended 
that the Department should identify and actively manage risks before it implements 
change. The Department now admits that its decision to use a licensing arrangement 
to support this system, where ETS Global BV provided a service directly to test-takers 
and not to the Department, was the “wrong model” and it did not have sufficient 
oversight over its licence agreement with ETS Global BV. The Department’s design of 
the system failed to recognise the obvious incentives that sponsors and individuals 
would have to cheat the SELT system. Individuals taking the tests could gain the 
right to enter and study in the country, providing an opportunity which could then 
be exploited by criminal organisations. ETS estimates that up to 97% of individuals 
taking speaking tests conducted in the UK between 2011 and 2014 were suspected of 
cheating using proxies. The scale of cheating caught the Department off guard, even 
though it had in 2012 seen intelligence from ETS regarding possible cases of fraud 
on ETS tests, which had led ETS to remove licences from eight of its test centres. The 
Department claims that it has learned from these experiences and has improved 
its licencing system since the cheating claims emerged, but it is not able to identify 
specific improvements or what impact they had achieved.
Recommendation: The Home Office should write to the committee immediately 
to explain what lessons it has learnt and what specific steps it has taken to ensure 
that such large-scale abuse cannot happen again.
2. The Home Office rushed to penalise students without establishing whether 
ETS was involved in fraud or if it had reliable evidence of people cheating. In 
June 2014, the Department accepted ETS’s analysis which identified individuals 
suspected of cheating within a TOEIC speaking test. Based upon this evidence, it 
acted swiftly against thousands of individuals by cancelling their visas, refusing 
pending applications or inviting them for interviews, but it did not conduct a 
thorough investigation of what had happened or whether the evidence ETS provided 
was reliable. The Department sent a team of civil servants to the United States in 
2014 to gain assurances about ETS’s data and its involvement in the cheating but 
did not ensure that the team had specific expertise or experience in linguistics or 
relevant technology. The Department only sought expert opinion and assurance 
two years after it began acting against individuals whom it suspected of cheating.
Recommendation: The Home Office should, within three months of this report, 
write to the Committee with evidence of its assessment from 2014 that ETS were 
not criminally complicit.
3. The Home Office’s commercial relationship with ETS meant it had insufficient 
recourse to claim compensation. The Department estimates that it has spent 
£21 million in responding to the testing fraud. But it has only been able to secure 
compensation worth £1.6 million from ETS Global BV for its involvement in the 
fraud. The Department’s licensing model for its Secure English Language Test 
providers meant it had limited capacity to seek any guarantees of compensation 
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from those providers in the case of any irregularities. The Department estimated 
that the cost of its Gold Command team response was just over £700,000, although 
it only tracked costs in other areas involved for a limited time and did not create new 
cost codes or accounting structures. The Department now recognises that it needs 
to improve the selection and management of its outsourcing partners. Its decision 
to use a licensing model was a mistake and the Department has committed to 
ensuring that its future agreements with private companies should include a redress 
mechanism in the event of contractor failure. The involvement of two overseas 
companies further complicated its ability to secure compensation.
Recommendation: The Home Office should, within six months of this report, 
review its arrangement with overseas partners, including redress mechanisms in 
the event of contractor failure, and write to the Committee with its results.
4. It is entirely unacceptable that, despite now recognising that hundreds of people 
still maintain their innocence, the Home Office has not acted to put right the 
wrongs caused by its actions. The Department has consistently argued that there 
was only a “very small” risk that its actions would affect innocent people and 
claims that it is concerned that hundreds of people continue to maintain their 
innocence. However, the Department has taken no action to proactively identify 
innocent people. Those who are affected by the Department’s action against them 
can go through the courts to try to demonstrate their innocence. But this can have 
a substantial financial and personal cost for those involved. Individuals also face 
several barriers in gaining access to the evidence that they need to demonstrate 
their innocence, such as the cost of conducting an appeal or the unavailability 
of their voice recordings from ETS. Many also still face difficulties finding a new 
sponsoring college or university even after winning their appeals. It is shameful 
that the Department knows it could have acted against innocent people but has not 
established a clear mechanism for them to raise concerns outside of the appeals 
process. We are encouraged that the Home Secretary has committed to looking at 
other options for people who feel they have been wronged to respond to accusations, 
and we await further statements on this subject.
Recommendation: The Home Office should, within three months of this report, 
create and promote a fair and trustworthy means of helping all individuals who 
may have been wrongly accused to come forward and clear their names, including 
ensuring that all evidence from ETS is made available to them.
5. As with the Windrush scandal, the Home Office has once again not done enough 
to identify the innocent and potentially vulnerable people who have been affected. 
During our evidence session, the Department admitted publicly for the first time 
that it was concerned that hundreds of innocent people continue to maintain their 
innocence, but it has not investigated this sufficiently. The Department has made no 
effort to identify individuals who have been wrongly accused. It justifies its position 
based on the evidence provided by ETS, the expert assurance it received in 2016 and 
the availability of the courts as a potential remedy. The Department relied solely 
upon the generic evidence provided by ETS and waited over two years to get any 
independent expert assurance on the methods ETS used to demonstrate cheating. 
The Department was willing to accept the evidence of ETS at face value, but it 
has not accepted additional evidence from those it has accused of cheating except 
7 English language tests for overseas students 
through the appeals process. It has not investigated contradictory evidence despite 
concerns that the National Union of Students and our sister Committee the Home 
Affairs Select Committee have raised and the number of appeals that individuals 
lodged against the Department’s actions.
Recommendation: The Home Office should address its lack of curiosity and 
establish safeguards to protect innocent people in the future, including ensuring 
that senior leadership do more to promote a culture of curiosity.
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1 The Department’s oversight of the 
Tier 4 visa system
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence 
from the Home Office (the Department) about English language tests for overseas 
students.1
2. The Department is responsible for designing and administering the points-based visa 
system which decides who can lawfully reside, work or study in the UK. It introduced 
Tier 4 of the Points Based System for student immigration in March 2009 to control the 
entry of students from outside the European Economic Area who come to the UK to 
study. Under immigration rules, most students from outside the EEA must take a licensed 
and approved Secure English Language Test (SELT). Higher Education institutions, such 
as universities, are allowed to assess applicants directly. From 2011 to 2014, ETS Global 
BV held a license for the administration and delivery of a Secure English Language Test 
called the Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC). ETS Global BV is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Educational Testing Service (ETS), a non-profit educational 
testing and assessment organisation whose headquarters are in the USA.2
3. In February 2014, a BBC Panorama investigation exposed organised fraud within the 
Tier 4 system, including evidence of cheating in two TOEIC test centres. The investigation 
showed proxies sitting TOEIC speaking tests and invigilators reading out multiple 
choice answers from reading and listening tests to candidates. ETS reviewed audio files 
from TOEIC speaking tests using voice recognition software and identified over 50,000 
individuals who may have used proxies to take their test between 2011 and 2014. ETS 
declared these tests as either invalid, where human checks confirmed that the voices 
matched, or questionable, where some doubt remained about the match. ETS classified 
33,663 tests, or 58% of all UK tests, as invalid and 22,476 tests, or 39% of all UK tests, as 
questionable.3 ETS provided this evidence to the Department, which then started action 
against individuals with invalid tests. The Department cancelled the visas and refused 
any pending applications of individuals who ETS classified as having invalid certificates. 
People with questionable results were required to sit another test and attend a Home Office 
interview if they wished to extend their existing visas.4
Design of the Tier 4 system
4. The Department recognised that there were “significant frailties” in the visa system 
that was established before 2010. In 2012, the National Audit Office estimated that a 
lack of controls when Tier 4 was implemented had meant that in 2009–10 between 
40,000 and 50,000 individuals had come to the UK as students but with the intention of 
working.5The previous committee reported on these frailties in 2012 and concluded that 
the Department had implemented Tier 4 of the Points Based System for students without 
effective controls to prevent abuse. We recommended that, before new processes were 
1 C&AG’s Report, Investigation into the response to cheating in English language tests, Session 2017–19, HC 2144, 
24 May 2019
2 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.1, 1.7–1.11, Figures 1, 3
3 C&AG’s Report, paras 2.1–2.2, 2.4–2.6
4 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.3, 3.25–3.26
5 Q 26
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rolled out, the Department should identify and actively manage risks before it implements 
change.6 The Department accepted that the reforms to the visa system it had introduced 
in the previous decade left the system without sufficient checks and balances to ensure 
students were genuinely coming to the UK to study. It also admitted that these checks 
had been insufficient to determine whether the educational institutions which supported 
student visa applications were of a requisite quality.7 The Department told us it had begun 
taking steps to address the frailties in the visa system, such as revoking the licences of 
colleges, and it claimed that this strategy was leading it towards ETS before the broadcast 
of the Panorama investigation. The Department revoked over 400 licences from sponsors 
associated with ETS between 2011 and 2014. However, it admitted that it was shocked by 
the scale of fraud exposed by the Panorama investigation and that its focus prior to 2014 
had been on the standard of educational institutions.8
5. We heard that the Department set up a licensing agreement with SELT providers in 
2007. The Department stated that it had assumed this licensing agreement did not need 
to conform to the same standards as a normal procurement. It explained that this was 
because third parties paid ETS Global BV to provide a service and not the Department. 
It could not explain why this assumption was made in 2007 and committed to looking 
into this, but admitted that the licensing system was “completely the wrong model”. The 
Department acknowledged that the licensing agreement left it without oversight over 
the integrity and standards of the visa system.9 We asked whether the Department had 
fully considered the possibility that the design of the system provided a strong incentive 
for institutions and individuals to cheat in order to gain financially or in terms of their 
immigration status, and for criminal enterprises to exploit people’s desperation. The 
Department did not provide any further detail on this point.10
6. The Department explained that its actions against sponsors before 2014 did not 
directly relate to the validity of ETS certificates. Although it revoked 400 licences of 
centres specifically associated with ETS, these were for issues of general compliance. In 
2012, the Department received intelligence from ETS about fraudulent behaviour in test 
centres, which had removed the licence to operate from eight of its test centres. Although 
ETS withdrew the results for 446 individuals whose tests were linked to those centres, the 
Department did not investigate wider cheating in ETS tests in response to this information. 
It could not explain why this had been the case and committed to providing further 
detail on the intelligence, when it was received and who acted upon it.11 The Department 
asserted that it was now confident that the Tier 4 visa system was “broadly compliant” and 
that the standard of visa compliance among people coming to study in the UK was now 
“high to very high”.12 It claimed that it had made several improvements to the Tier 4 visa 
system, including requiring licensees to regularly provide data to the Department and 
introducing stricter arrangements on how they conduct tests on the day. However, it was 
unable to explain what changes it had made to address issues surrounding the quality of 
the data that licensees provided, and the systems that SELT providers use.13
6 Committee of Public Accounts, Immigration: The points based system - student route, Seventh Report of Session 
2012–13, HC 101, 24 August 2012
7 Q 26
8 Qq 29–31, 35
9 Qq 37–39
10 Q 32
11 Qq 35–37; Home Office letter to Committee dated 6 August 2019
12 Qq 27, 88
13 Qq 114–116
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The role of ETS
7. The Department absolved ETS of any involvement in the organised cheating by June 
2014 and relied upon the evidence ETS provided.14 We asked how the Department ruled 
out any complicity on the part of ETS. The Department explained that it did consider 
whether there was the potential for criminal action against ETS Global BV, but not ETS 
Global BV’s American parent, ETS, as the two were considered separate companies. The 
Department told us that ETS was ultimately responsible for providing corrected results 
and test the validity of those results. It told us that there was a clear distinction between 
ETS Global BV, which was administering and providing tests in the UK, and ETS, which 
held the voice files needed to match the recordings taken as part of the tests and establish 
the scale of the problem.15 The Department added that it had received legal advice which 
stated that it could rely upon the data provided by ETS, but it was unsure what the specific 
components of that advice were and committed to sending us a copy of that advice.16
8. Between February and June 2014, ETS faced a huge workload to reassess 66,000 
TOEIC tests and applied three conditions to determine whether a test was invalid 
or questionable.17 The National Audit Office found that ETS had not used its voice 
recognition techniques before to detect cheating in TOEIC tests. Each test was checked by 
two trained listeners after being tested by the voice recognition software. Nineteen staff 
experienced in assessing a different test, the Test of English as a foreign language (TOEFL), 
carried out voice biometric tests on the TOEIC sample.18 The Department explained that 
ETS then provided corrected test results to the Department in May or June 2014. The 
Department started to take action against individuals who were identified as holding 
invalid certificates in June 2014, four months after the Panorama documentary.19 The 
Department based this response entirely on ETS’s evidence and accepted that it should 
have sought independent expert assurance, particularly in response to potential fraud 
at the scale ETS uncovered.20 It acknowledged that it asked ETS to conduct its analysis 
quickly. The Department explained that this rapidity reflected Ministers’ demands for a 
“speedy and robust response”.21
9. The Department sent a team of civil servants to the United States in 2014 to provide 
assurance on the accuracy of the data provided by ETS on fraudulent tests. The National 
Audit Office found, however, that none of those in the delegation had expertise in linguistics 
or the technology or techniques being used by ETS to provide that assurance.22 We asked, 
therefore, what the value was of sending a delegation to investigate whether criminal 
conspiracy had occurred if the delegation did not have the expertise needed to determine 
this. The Department explained that the purpose of this delegation was to investigate how 
ETS was analysing its data.23 In 2015, the National Union of Students (NUS) raised doubts 
about the accuracy of the methods used by ETS. The NUS report suggested that as many 
as 2,000 people could have been incorrectly categorised.24 However, we heard that the 
14 Qq 45–46, 52–53, 64
15 Qq 47–50, 52–53
16 Qq 70–72
17 Qq 25, 47; C&AG’s Report, para 2.13
18 C&AG’s Report, paras 2, 2.4, 2.13
19 Qq 45–46, 48
20 Qq 57, 62, 94
21 Qq 34, 64
22 Q 54; C&AG’s Report, para 2.7
23 Qq 53–54
24 C&AG’s Report, para 2.8
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Department waited until 2016, two years after it started taking action against individuals, 
before it sought independent expert assurance to support the validity of ETS’s evidence. 
The Department accepted, though, that this independent expert assurance should have 
been secured earlier.25
Compensation from ETS
10. The Department did not keep detailed records of its spending in responding to 
cheating, but estimated it had spent £21 million dealing with the repercussions of cheating 
in TOEIC by November 2017. This consisted of £9 million on immigration enforcement, 
£5.5 million on appeals and judicial reviews, £3 million dealing with temporary visa 
applications and £2 million on criminal and financial investigations. In 2018, the 
Department agreed a settlement of £1.6 million in compensation from ETS Global BV.26 
The Department could not identify how much it had spent on litigation against ETS 
Global BV, although it estimated that this amount was less than the £1.6m it eventually 
received.27 The committee were concerned that this level of compensation did not reflect 
the level of cheating or the amount that ETS Global BV made from holding a SELT licence. 
The Department could not explain how much money ETS had made from holding a SELT 
licence, and the Department agreed that its licensing agreement provided significant value 
to ETS.28
11. The Department also failed to secure a larger amount of compensation as it did not 
adequately track the costs it incurred while tackling the fraud. The National Audit Office 
found that the Home Office’s estimates were “extremely vulnerable” in demonstrating the 
costs it had incurred in responding to cheating.29 Although the Department set up a Gold 
Command team, it had limited information on its costs, estimating this to be £700,000 
based on the number of staff hours booked.30 The Department explained that it made 
basic attempts to record the cost of its response to cheating in TOEIC, but did not set up 
new costs codes or a specific method of tracking this. We were concerned that tracking 
what the Department was spending had been an afterthought. The Department explained 
that it was “overwhelmingly focused” on responding to the issue, including closing bogus 
colleges and dealing with people who it suspected of cheating. The Department also 
highlighted the difficulty of establishing that its £21 million costs were causally related to 
the fraud.31
12. We asked whether the Department’s decision to use a licence arrangement for SELT, 
rather than a formal contractual relationship with providers, affected the Department’s 
ability to secure compensation. The Department acknowledged that a contract model 
could have provided stronger guarantees over ETS’s liability to pay compensation, but it 
stressed that this would not automatically have been the case. The Department told us that 
the amount of compensation it could have secured through a contractual model would 
have depended on whether the contract included parent company guarantees or parent 
company support. It explained that the ETS Global BV’s UK branch had ceased trading 
25 Q 62
26 C&AG’s Report, para 3.7, Figure 8
27 Qq 89, 91, 93
28 Qq 38, 73–76
29 C&AG’s Report, para 3.12
30 Qq 61–62; Home Office letter to Committee dated 6 August 2019
31 Qq 80–83; Home Office letter to Committee dated 6 August 2019
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at the time the Department was seeking compensation, and that its legal advice was that 
it could only seek compensation from ETS Global BV.32 The Department was unable to 
explain to us what level of due diligence it had conducted before starting its legal action 
against ETS Global BV, but it defended taking this decision.33 It asserted that it had “tried 
long and hard to get more but the sad fact is that the assets available were essentially only 
slightly more than the amount that we got”. It similarly asserted that if it if had decided 
to go through litigation instead of settling, it was likely that it would have received less, 
or no, compensation, and its legal advice at the time had been to agree to the settlement.34
13. The Department recognised that its decision to use a licensing model had been a 
mistake and asserted that it had changed the way it approached commercial partnerships. 
It acknowledged that the structure of the commercial arrangements and the relationship 
between two separate overseas companies meant it had had no claim for compensation 
against the American parent company. The Department also revealed that ETS Global 
BV’s possession of relatively few available assets limited the level of compensation to 
£1.6 million, and its counsel therefore advised the Department that this settlement was 
the best available.35 However, the Department defended its use of outsourcing contracts 
more generally, even though it recognised that such arrangements inherently carry some 
risk.36 The Department asserted that it had learned from this experience, and committed 
to ensuring that any future agreements should anticipate litigation from the outset and 
ensure that overseas partners have assets that can support meaningful liabilities and 
penalties.37
32 Qq 77–79
33 Qq 89, 91
34 Q 79
35 Qq 76, 79
36 Qq 132–133
37 Qq 83, 136–139
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2 The Home Office’s response
Routes of challenge available to affected people
14. Based on the evidence the Department received from ETS, it revoked the visas of 
anyone with an invalid test. It also required anyone with questionable results who wished 
to extend their existing visa to take a new English language test and attend an interview 
with the Department. The National Audit Office found that at least 11,356 people linked 
to an invalid or questionable Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC) 
had left the UK by the end of March 2019. At least 7,206 people left voluntarily, and the 
Department removed or denied re-entry to at least 2,859 people. However, a number 
of people remain in the UK and continue to protest their innocence. Around 12,500 
individuals matched to invalid or questionable TOEIC certificates appealed against 
immigration decisions between April 2014 and March 2019, and they were successful in 
3,714, or 40%, of first-tier appeals. The Department appealed in the upper tribunal against 
three-quarters of the cases it had lost before September 2016.38
15. The Department acknowledged that hundreds of people—and possibly more—
continued to protest their innocence, but said they had had a right of challenge. It 
recognised that there was a risk that some innocent people might have been caught up in 
its action but described the risk as “numerically very small”.39 The Department stated that 
assurance from its independent expert in 2016 found no more than a 1% chance of tests 
being incorrectly identified as invalid. It explained that ETS used a structured process to 
identify possible cheats where three separate conditions, including two human assessors, 
had to be met before ETS would conclude an individual’s test was invalid.40 However, the 
Department accepted it had not actively examined whether innocent people were wrongly 
assessed as cheats. It explained that it relied on ETS’s assessment and the expert assurance 
it received in 2016.41 We asked the Department whether it accepted that the risk levels, and 
the number of people affected, might have been small, but the impact on those affected 
was catastrophic. The Department said that while it had recognised early on that there was 
a risk that some innocent individuals could have been wrongly caught up in the issue and, 
while this was a small risk, it still considered it as very important. The Department told 
us that was critical that the right remedy was in place for people to challenge immigration 
decisions, which they could do so through the courts. It asserted that it had repeatedly 
come to the conclusion that the evidence available to the Department, including ETS’s 
assessment of the test results was sufficient to justify the Department’s finding of deception 
and that the onus was on individuals to demonstrate their innocence.42 The Department 
said that individuals therefore needed to get in touch with it to provide the evidence to 
demonstrate their innocence.43
16. The NAO found that not all students have been able to obtain the information they 
needed to demonstrate their innocence, including difficulties obtaining their personal 
data, such as the original recordings and other material from the day of the tests, or the 
38 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.25–3.27, 3.31–3.33, Figures 10, 11
39 Qq 25, 95
40 Qq 107–108
41 Q 94; C&AG’s Report, para 2.17
42 Q 97
43 Q 129
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voice clips that were used as evidence against them.44 In its written evidence, Matrix 
Chambers claimed the Department should have done more to investigate weaknesses in 
the evidence rather than expecting individuals to challenge it in court.45 The Department 
accepted that people had not always been able to obtain voice recording evidence from 
ETS and assured us that it had checked “very recently” to make sure that all people who 
request voice files now received them.46
17. We were concerned that the written evidence we received from over seventy 
individuals highlighted “real human concerns” including the cost of legal fees innocent 
people faced to clear their names.47 One individual told us that they had spent £15,000 on 
legal fees, having already spent £45,000 on university fees. The Department acknowledged 
that the amount that some people found they needed to spend to make their case in the 
immigration system was a real concern. However, it asserted that it operated within a 
system established by Parliament through the Immigration Act 2014 that had made major 
changes to the remedies that are available to individuals in these cases.48
The proportionality of the Department’s response
18. We asked the Department about the impact of the TOEIC scandal on Britain’s 
reputation internationally, particularly in combination with the Windrush scandal. The 
Department considered the TOEIC issue to be profoundly different from Windrush, but 
regret anything which damaged the UK’s reputation internationally or any innocent people 
being caught up in its response to cheating in English language tests. The Department told 
us that it had active conversations with colleagues in India and other countries, about the 
UK, its immigration system, and its education provision and that the system was highly 
regarded internationally.49 It told us that it was very pleased to welcome students to the 
UK and that last year had seen a 10% increase in students compared to the year before; 
the highest number of student visas ever issued.50 The Department did not accept our 
concerns that its actions reflected a Departmental culture which was not curious and not 
caring. We received written evidence that described the Department as “disinterested” 
and reliant on generic evidence, though the Department refuted accusations that it lacked 
curiosity.51 The Department told us that caseworkers were allowed to take the findings of 
the ETS results and make decisions on individual cases. It was not an automatic process 
and each case had to be judged.52
19. We received written evidence from, Matrix Chambers, which told us that, in 
responding to cheating, “the Home Office took a knee-jerk reaction without reaction 
without addressing the nuances”.53 The Department did not accept this characterisation, 
and told us that its response had been a structured process that relied on a number of 
sources of evidence. It said it needed to respond to a large-scale fraud and that it had 
44 C&AG’s Report, para 2.21
45 Q 107–108; Ev ELT0085 Matrix Chambers submission paras 7–9
46 Qq 108, 118
47 Q 25
48 Qq 104–105
49 Qq 120–123
50 Qq 116, 122
51 Qq 98, 107–108; Ev ELT0085 Matrix Chambers submission para 3b
52 Q 111
53 Q 107, Ev ELT0085 Matrix Chambers submission
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sufficient evidence to support its actions. The Department maintained that it needed to 
act quickly in response to widespread fraud, and it had prioritised the need to act against 
criminals, colleges and people they suspected of cheating.54
20. We asked the Department if it thought its approach of people taking the Home Office 
to court was a cost-effective way of dealing with individual cases. The Department said 
that while rights of challenge were granted by legislation it would in principle like to see the 
volume of appeals to be less. The Department said that the Court of Appeal had recently 
issued a judgement that, before the government made decisions that individuals had 
deceived one authority or the other, government should have put that issue to the individual 
and given them an opportunity to rebut or provide other evidence. The Department told 
us that it was trialling schemes which offered individuals the chance to directly respond to 
the Department’s decisions or provide further evidence to demonstrate their innocence.55 
The Department told us it would need to consider whether such measures would be 
appropriate in TOEIC cases.56
21. We received written evidence from Migrant Voice which described the difficulties 
individuals can face in finding a new sponsor after winning their appeals.57 The 
Department confirmed that individuals who have won appeals should not face rejections 
from other universities or sponsors. The Department said individuals could contact it 
directly if they have cleared their names but education institutions still rejected their 
applications based on their immigration history or immigration databases not being 
up to date. The Department committed to providing contact details to the Committee 
so people could raise their concerns via their MP.58 The Department explained that the 
Home Secretary was actively considering whether the Government could do more to 
support people affected by the Department’s actions.59 We were encouraged by a written 
statement published on 23 July which said the Department was reviewing its guidance to 
ensure it is making the right decisions on TOEIC cases to ensure it is balancing a belief 
that deception was committed some years ago against other factors that would normally 
lead to leave being granted, especially where children are involved. The Department also 
committed to ensuring that there was no further action against people where there is no 
evidence an ETS certificate was used in an immigration application.60
54 Qq 81, 98, 107
55 Qq 124–128
56 Q 126
57 Q 140; Ev ELT0012 Migrant Voice submission para 9.1
58 Qq 140–143
59 Q 98
60 Immigration: Written Statement, Sajid Javid (The Secretary of State for the Home Department), HCWS1803, 23 
July 2019
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Formal minutes
Monday 9 September 2019
Members present:
Meg Hillier, in the Chair
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
Caroline Flint
Nigel Mills
Gareth Snell
Draft Report (English language tests for overseas students), proposed by the Chair, brought 
up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 21 read and agreed to.
Introduction agreed to.
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the One hundred and sixteenth of the Committee to the 
House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 16 October at 2:00pm
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
Wednesday 10 July 2019
Sir Philip Rutnam, Permanent Secretary, Home Office, Shona Dunn, Second 
Permanent Secretary, Home Office, and Mark Thomson, Director General 
UK Visas and Immigration, Home Office Q1–144
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Khanzada, Kashif (ELT0035)
Manjayil, Basil Pappachan (ELT0055)
Matrix Chambers (ELT0085)
Migrant Voice (ELT0012)
Migrant Voice (ELT0054)
Migrant Voice (ELT0086)
Mondel, Roni (ELT0063)
Mukhtar, Muhammad Zahid (ELT0078) 
Mustafiz, S M Imrose (ELT0002)
Noor, Allah (ELT0007)
Patel, Mitangi Shaileshkumar (ELT0039) 
Rahima, Mrs Bibi (ELT0019)
Rahman, MD Khalilur Rahman (ELT0064) 
Rahman, Mr MD Mosiur (ELT0025)
Rahman, Mr S M Ashiqur (ELT0046)
Rahman, Mr Wahidur (ELT0072)
Rahman, Shazidur (ELT0066)
Rana, Shohel (ELT0031)
Rani, Geeta (ELT0029)
Rasel, Sheikh (ELT0058)
Rashid, MD Abdur (ELT0036)
Rizwan, Muhammad (ELT0045)
Shahzad, Mr Azhar (ELT0068)
Shaikh, MD Masum (ELT0060)
Shamim, MD Saydur Rahman (ELT0022)
Singh, Mr Sarbjeet (ELT0008)
Sohag, Mr Abu Naim MD Sajjad Karim (ELT0083) 
Tabassum, Mr Ahmer Mujtaba (ELT0026) 
Tarek, Mr Abdullah Al (ELT0082)
Uddin, Jalal (ELT0032)
68 Waqas, Mr Ahmed (ELT0081)
69 Westgate Solicitors (ELT0014)
70 Wright, Mr Robert (ELT0001)
71 Yaqoob, Asim (ELT0006)
 English language tests for overseas students 20
72 Yasin, A (ELT0038)
73 Zakria, Muhammad (ELT0040)
21 English language tests for overseas students 
List of Reports from the Committee 
during the current Parliament
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the 
Committee’s website. The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report 
is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.
Session 2017–19
First Report Tackling online VAT fraud and error HC 312 
(Cm 9549)
Second Report Brexit and the future of Customs HC 401 
(Cm 9565)
Third Report Hinkley Point C HC 393 
(Cm 9565)
Fourth Report Clinical correspondence handling at NHS Shared 
Business Services
HC 396 
(Cm 9575)
Fifth Report Managing the costs of clinical negligence in hospital 
trusts
HC 397 
(Cm 9575)
Sixth Report The growing threat of online fraud HC 399 
(Cm 9575)
Seventh Report Brexit and the UK border HC 558 
(Cm 9575)
Eighth Report Mental health in prisons HC 400 
(Cm 9575) 
(Cm 9596)
Ninth Report Sheffield to Rotherham tram-trains HC 453 
(Cm 9575)
Tenth Report High Speed 2 Annual Report and Accounts HC 454 
(Cm 9575)
Eleventh Report Homeless households HC 462 
(Cm 9575) 
(Cm 9618)
Twelfth Report HMRC’s Performance in 2016–17 HC 456 
(Cm 9596)
Thirteenth Report NHS continuing healthcare funding HC 455 
(Cm 9596)
Fourteenth Report Delivering Carrier Strike HC 394 
(Cm 9596)
Fifteenth Report Offender-monitoring tags HC 458 
(Cm 9596)
Sixteenth Report Government borrowing and the Whole of 
Government Accounts
HC 463 
(Cm 9596)
Seventeenth Report Retaining and developing the teaching workforce HC 460 
(Cm 9596)
 English language tests for overseas students 22
Eighteenth Report Exiting the European Union HC 467 
(Cm 9596)
Nineteenth Report Excess Votes 2016–17 HC 806 
(Cm 9596)
Twentieth Report Update on the Thameslink Programme HC 466 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-First Report The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Magnox HC 461 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Second Report The monitoring, inspection and funding of 
Learndirect Ltd.
HC 875 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Third Report Alternative Higher Education Providers HC 736 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fourth Report Care Quality Commission: regulating health and 
social care
HC 468 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fifth Report The sale of the Green Investment Bank HC 468 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Sixth Report Governance and departmental oversight of the 
Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local 
Enterprise Partnership
HC 896 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Seventh Report Government contracts for Community Rehabilitation 
Companies
HC 897 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Eighth Report Ministry of Defence: Acquisition and support of 
defence equipment
HC 724 
(Cm 9618)
Twenty-Ninth Report Sustainability and transformation in the NHS HC 793 
(Cm 9618)
Thirtieth Report Academy schools’ finances HC 760 
(Cm 9618)
Thirty-First Report The future of the National Lottery HC 898 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Second Report Cyber-attack on the NHS HC 787 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Third Report Research and Development funding across 
government
HC 668 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Fourth Report Exiting the European Union: The Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
HC 687 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Fifth Report Rail franchising in the UK HC 689 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Sixth Report Reducing modern slavery HC 886 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Seventh Report Exiting the European Union: The Department 
for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and the 
Department for International Trade
HC 699 
(Cm 9643)
Thirty-Eighth Report The adult social care workforce in England HC 690 
(Cm 9667)
Thirty-Ninth Report The Defence Equipment Plan 2017–2027 HC 880 
(Cm 9667)
23 English language tests for overseas students 
Fortieth Report Renewable Heat Incentive in Great Britain HC 696 
(Cm 9667)
Forty-First Report Government risk assessments relating to Carillion HC 1045 
(Cm 9667)
Forty-Second Report Modernising the Disclosure and Barring Service HC 695 
(Cm 9667)
Forty-Third Report Clinical correspondence handling in the NHS HC 929
(Cm 9702)
Forty-Fourth Report Reducing emergency admissions HC 795 
(Cm 9702)
Forty-Fifth Report The higher education market HC 693 
(Cm 9702)
Forty-Sixth Report Private Finance Initiatives HC 894
(Cm 9702)
Forty-Seventh Report Delivering STEM skills for the economy HC 691 
(Cm 9702)
Forty-Eighth Report Exiting the EU: The financial settlement HC 973 
(Cm 9702)
Forty-Ninth Report Progress in tackling online VAT fraud HC 1304 
(Cm 9702)
Fiftieth Report Financial sustainability of local authorities HC 970 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-First Report BBC commercial activities HC 670 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Second Report Converting schools to academies HC 697 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Third Report Ministry of Defence’s contract with Annington 
Property Limited
HC 974 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Fourth Report Visit to Washington DC HC 1404 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Fifth Report Employment and Support Allowance HC 975 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Sixth Report Transforming courts and tribunals HC 976 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Seventh Report Supporting Primary Care Services: NHS England’s 
contract with Capita
HC 698 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Eighth Report Strategic Suppliers HC 1031 
(Cm 9702)
Fifty-Ninth Report Skill shortages in the Armed Forces HC 1027 
(9740)
Sixtieth Report Ofsted’s inspection of schools HC1029 
(Cm 9740)
Sixty-First Report Ministry of Defence nuclear programme HC 1028 
(Cm 9740)
 English language tests for overseas students 24
Sixty-Second Report Price increases for generic medications HC 1184 
(Cm 9740)
Sixty-Third Report Interface between health and social care HC 1376 
(Cm 9740)
Sixty-Fourth Report Universal Credit HC 1375 
(Cp 18)
Sixty-Fifth Report Nuclear Decommissioning Authority HC 1375 
(Cp 18)
Sixty-Sixth Report HMRC’s performance in 2017–18 HC 1526 
(Cp 18)
Sixty-Seventh Report Financial Sustainability of police forces in England 
and Wales
HC 1513 
(Cp 18)
Sixty-Eighth Report Defra’s progress towards Brexit HC 1514 
(CP 18)
Sixty-Ninth Report Sale of student loans HC 1527 
(Cp 56)
Seventieth Report Department for Transport’s implementation of BrexitHC 1657 
(Cp 56)
Seventy-First Report Department for Health and Social Care accounts HC 1515 
(Cp 56)
Seventy-Second Report Mental health services for children and young peopleHC 1593 
(Cp 79)
Seventy-Third Report Academy accounts and performance HC 1597 
(Cp 79)
Seventy-Fourth Report Whole of Government accounts HC 464 
(Cp 79)
Seventy-Fifth Report Pre-appointment hearing: preferred candidate for 
Comptroller and Auditor General
HC 1883 
(Cp 79)
Seventy-Sixth Report Local Government Spending HC 1775 
(Cp 79)
Seventy-Seventh Report Defence Equipment Plan 2018–28 HC 1519 
(Cp 79)
Seventy-Eighth Report Improving Government planning and spending HC 1596 
(Cp 97)
Seventy-Ninth Report Excess Votes 2017–18 HC 1931 
(Cp 97)
Eightieth Report Capita’s contracts with the Ministry of Defence HC 1736 
(Cp 97)
Eighty-First Report Rail management and timetabling HC 1793 
(Cp 97)
Eighty-Second Report Windrush generation and the Home Office HC 1518 
(Cp 113)
Eighty-Third Report Clinical Commissioning Groups HC 1740 
(Cp 97)
25 English language tests for overseas students 
Eighty-Fourth Report Bank of England’s central services HC 1739 
(Cp 97)
Eighty-Fifth Report Auditing local government HC 1738 
(Cp 97)
Eighty-Sixth Report Brexit and the UK border: further progress review HC 1942 
(Cp 113)
Eighty-Seventh Report Renewing the EastEnders set HC 1737 
(Cp 113)
Eighty-Eighth Report Transforming children’s services HC 1741 
(Cp 113)
Eighty-Ninth Report Public cost of decommissioning oil and gas 
infrastructure
HC 1742 
(Cp 113)
Ninetieth Report BBC and personal service companies HC 1522 
(Cp 113)
Ninety-First Report NHS financial sustainability: progress review HC 1743 
(Cp 113)
Ninety-Second Report Crossrail: progress review HC 2004 
(Cp 113)
Ninety-Third Report Disclosure and Barring Service: progress review HC 2006
Ninety-Fourth Report Transforming rehabilitation: progress review HC 1747
Ninety-Fifth Report Accessing public services through the Government’s 
Verify digital system
HC 1748
Ninety-Sixth Report Adult health screening HC 1746
Ninety-Seventh Report Local Government Governance and Accountability HC 2077
Ninety-Eighth Report The apprenticeships programme: progress review HC 1749
Ninety-Ninth Report Cyber security in the UK HC 1745
One-Hundredth Report NHS waiting times for elective and cancer treatment HC 1750
One Hundred and First 
Report
Submarine defueling and dismantling HC 2041
One Hundred and Second 
Report
Military Homes HC 2136
One Hundred and Third 
Report
Planning and the broken housing market HC 1744
One Hundred and Fourth 
Report
Transport infrastructure in the South West HC 1753
One Hundred and Fifth 
Report
Local enterprise partnerships: progress review HC 1754
One Hundred and Sixth 
Report
Eurotunnel HC 2460
 English language tests for overseas students 26
One Hundred and 
Seventh Report
Consumer protection HC 1752
One Hundred and Eighth 
Report
Emergency Services Network: progress review HC 1755
One Hundred and Ninth 
Report
Completing Crossrail HC 2127
One Hundred and Tenth 
Report
Sale of public land HC 2040
One Hundred and 
Eleventh Report
Funding for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland HC 1751
One Hundred and Twelfth 
Report
Brexit Consultancy Costs HC 2342
One Hundred and 
Thirteenth Report
Network Rail’s sale of railway arches HC 2230
One Hundred and 
Fourteenth Report
Help to Buy: Equity loan scheme: progress review HC 2046
One Hundred and 
Fifteenth Report
Penalty charge notices in healthcare HC 2038
First Special Report Chair of the Public Accounts Committee’s Second 
Annual Report
HC 347
Second Special Report Third Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee 
of Public Accounts
HC 1399
Third Special Report Fourth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee 
of Public Accounts
HC 2370
